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The main objective of this project is to examine the effectiveness of Basel regulations on the 
financial stability of Kenya. In order to achieve this objective, quarterly time-series data ranging 
from 1995:1 to 2019:4 is employed. The empirical methodology of the study is conducted using a 
Structural Vector Autoregressive model. Five endogenous variables (z-score, bank capital to total 
asset ratio, regulatory quality index, liquidity assets to deposits and short funding ratio and bank 
regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets ratio) are used. Innovations in capital adequacy ratio has 
an economically significant effect on the  financial stability of Kenya. There is a permanent positive 
response of financial stability to shocks in capital adequacy ratio. The result of  minimum liquidity 
requirement ratio is statistically significant, but the sign is unexpected. A shock to liquidity 
requirement ratio has a negative effect on the financial stability. Bank supervisory guidance has 
no statistically significant effect on the financial stability of Kenya, likely due to the 
implementation problems of this regulation in the country. The variance decomposition result 
confirms the result of the impulse response function about the effectiveness of financial regulation 
variables on the financial stability of Kenya. Capital regulation shock explains 42.90% of the 
fluctuations of financial stability and the shock to liquidity requirement ratio explains 25.85%. 
Major challenges of Basel implementation in Kenya are lack of reliable data and information, 
development of the sound risk-management system, asymmetry in supervision, operational cost, 
access to finance, and market imperfection. Therefore, there is a need to hire highly qualified, 
responsible, transparent, and independent supervisors for the successful implementation of Basel 
Accords as the result supports that financial regulations have a significant effect on the financial 
stability of Kenya.  
 
Keywords:  





A stable and efficient financial system plays an important role in economic development 
by providing resources to the real economy and facilitate economic growth through the 
efficient allocation of savings to the most profitable investment opportunities. It also has 
an important function in diversifying, pooling, and shifting risks to those agents who are 
ready to bear it (Prochniak and Wasiak, 2016). In addition, a sound financial system will 
have sufficient capital to absorb losses and sufficient liquidity to manage operations and 
volatility (Ruiz and Bruhn, 2019). On contrary, inefficient and weak financial systems are 
vulnerable to contagion, less capable of overcoming exchange market pressures and 
volatile capital flows, and more likely to aggravate and magnify the impacts of financial 
crises and other economic shocks (Khan and Khan, 2007).  
This recognition has forced regulators, bankers, and other market participants to have a  
primary objective of maintaining financial stability in global banking and financial 
markets (Alici and Ozgoker, 2006). This is because financial stability is the joint stability 
of financial institutions and financial markets that are the two key components of the 
financial system. Financial stability is not only avoiding financial crises and managing 
systemic financial risk, but also the risk that triggers a loss of economic value or 
confidence in the financial system (Mariana and Donath, 2008). Therefore, financial 
stability is a vital prerequisite not only for monetary stability but also for the better 
development of the economy (Githinj, 2016).  
 On the other hand, financial crises have a negative impact on output and employment.  
For instance, in the 2007-09 global financial crises a minimum of double-digit fall has been 
observed in output of European economy. The average fall of real GDP from peak to 
trough by 9% is the testimony for the sizeable loss of output due to financial crises. The 
negative consequence of crises on output leads to a deterioration of the labor market that 
raised the rate of unemployment approximately by 7% during the same downturn 
(European Commission, 2009). Financial crises also lead to a recession that has a direct 
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result on employment. Skills are lost and unemployed youths become less productive 
over time because they missed a chance of learning by doing. The consequence of 
unemployment has a long-lasting negative effect on productivity and thus on long-run 
economic growth. Besides, financial instability results in welfare reduction and be a 
heavy burden on the economy since fluctuations of price variables in the financial market, 
amplify economic risks and bankruptcy of financial institutions or corporations (Schinasi, 
2004).  
 
Therefore, regulations and supervisions are vital to build a safer financial system and 
ensure its resilience to financial crises and economic recessions (Peterson, 2019). The main 
goal of these financial regulations is to keep the financial systems, financial institutions, 
and financial markets, safe and sound (Brownbridge and Kirkpatrick, 2010).  
There are two arguments on the effect of financial regulation on financial stability. The 
first view is on the importance of strict financial regulation on financial markets and 
financial institutions. The proponents stressed financial stability will be promoted due to 
tighter financial regulations. Any level of financial distress will be addressed with the 
formation of stable buffers is the view under this category. On the other hand, others 
argued that strict financial regulation is the one that creates instability of the financial 
system that may have an adverse effect on the real sector of the economy (Shaddady and 
Moore, 2019).  
 
Moreover, Policy makers need to think beyond financial regulations of capital 
requirements and liquidity requirements to deal with financial instabilities (Kiemo et al, 
2019). It is also essential to study the sources of financial instability as it results from 
different phenomena. Even if the sources come in many different forms, they have 
common elements. One or more of the following are the associated causes of financial 
crises. Credit volume and asset price change; extreme disorder of financial 
intermediaries, and the provision of external funds to different players of the economy; 
balance sheet problems of economic and financial agents (of firms, households, financial 
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intermediaries, and sovereigns); capital and liquidity support by the government. It is 
very difficult to measure the financial crises with a single indicator because of its 
multidimensional behavior (Claessens et al, 2013).   
 
Financial instabilities can exist due to a sharp increase in asset prices. Theories suggested 
that the possible reasons for the deviation of asset prices from fundamentals could be 
information variations, disagreement among investors in the valuation of assets, sales 
barriers, and other limits of arbitrage. Another common factor that creates financial 
instability is a rapid increase in credit. Various factors triggered credit risks including 
structural changes in markets such as poorly designed financial liberalizations and 
innovations and shocks. The result of credit risk is a fall in profit and investment. This 
deterioration in profit and investment leads to the inability of firms to the repayment of 
their debt. This results financial system fragility that transmitted to banks as a form of a 
bank loan default (Glossop, 2011).  
 
This leads to the establishment of  the Basel committee for mitigating the risk of financial 
contagion that had spread with the growth of cross-border banking to address regulatory 
arbitrage by large internationally active banks. These internationally active banks were 
regulated by a series of prudential bank standards that were formulated by the Basel 
committee (Jones and Knaack, 2019).  Even if the vast majority of developing countries 
are not members of the Basel committee, many of them have adopted global banking 
standards, from Basel I up to Basel III. It is also adopted in Kenya, international financial 
regulations and market liberalizations has been taken place in the country since 1995. 
Therefore, this project briefly discusses the Basel measures and their effectiveness as well 
as implementation challenges in Kenya. Related literatures and financial stability reports 
of Central Bank of Kenya is reviewed to get enough input for addressing this topic.  
The main objective of this project is to examine the effect of financial regulations on the 
financial stability of Kenya. In order to achieve this objective, time-series data ranging 
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from 1995 to 2019 is used for analysis purposes. Studies on the same topic conducted by 
(Alici and Ozgoker, 2006) and (Mwega, 2014) in Turkey and in Kenya respectively, used 
descriptive statistics for measuring the effectiveness of financial regulations for 
safeguarding financial stability. This study examines the effect of financial regulation on 
the financial stability of Kenya by applying the Structural Vector Autoregressive model 
besides to the descriptive statistics. Empirical methodology helps to explain the 
magnitude of the response of financial stability for the impulses of financial regulation 
variables.  
In addition to the methodology gap, this project fills the time gap of previous studies by 
providing the updated information on the evolution and trends of financial stability of 
Kenya as the latest paper conducted in the case of Kenya is in 2014. The trend analysis is 
conducted to see the basic characteristics of financial system of Kenya and comparison 
with low-middle income countries is made as it helps to measure the country’s 
performance of financial system.  In addition, the previous study in the case of Kenya by 
Mwega (2014) assessed only the implementation of internal financial regulations, 
whereas this paper examines both the international and internal financial regulations 
implemented in the case study under consideration.  
The basic questions of the project are: What can we say about the performance of financial 
system in Kenya? Do the implemented financial regulations and Basel Accords are 
effective in strengthening the financial stability of Kenya? In addition, what are the 
implementation challenges of the Basel Accord in Kenya?  
The project is organized under six sections. The first section includes an introduction of 
the project, project objectives, motivation, and an outline of the project report. The second 
section of this project reviews theoretical background and literature review. The third 
section of this project is devoted to an overview of the financial system in Kenya and 
trend analysis of variables. In the fourth section of the project, the empirical methodology 
of the study is presented. The fifth section deals with the results and discussion. Lastly, 
section six presents conclusions and policy implications. 
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2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This section reviews both the theoretical background and empirical literatures related to 
financial regulation and financial stability that supports the present study. Under 
theoretical background, theoretical reviews on financial regulation and financial stability 
are reviewed. While under empirical literature empirical studies on the nexus between 
financial regulation and financial stability are briefly discussed.  
2.1 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
2.1.1 Concepts and definitions 
 
Definition of Financial System  
 The financial system is a way of wealth accumulation, the transformation of that wealth 
to the future, to finance feasible investment projects, and to manage risk by the economic 
agents of this country or region (Schmidt et al, 2006). Studies conducted in recent years 
suggested that financial development helps to minimize economic volatility as a whole. 
Economic fluctuation results in an increase in the number of poor people. Therefore, the 
financial system is used as an important insurance weapon for poor and near-poor 
society. The risk- reduction ability of the financial system is working if there are also 
supporting financial institutions that provide prudent risk-taking incentives. Otherwise, 
financial systems and their development can lead to amplification of risk than to its 
mitigation (Ruiz and Bruhn, 2019). 
Definition of Financial Stability 
It will be challenging to define and give exact meaning for financial stability because the 
term has no widely accepted definition. Different academicians, central banks, and 
policymakers give their own explanations for financial stability. The proponents of two 
schools of thought who studied the concept of financial stability followed two approaches 
for defining the issue. The first school of thought preferred the approach of defining 
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financial instability, while the other group makes an effort to define financial stability 
(Anatolevna, and Remilevna, 2013).  
The first school of thought for the definition of financial stability is given by Mishkin 
(1999). He preferred to define financial instability rather than defining financial stability.  
Financial instability that occurs from vulnerable financial systems to shocks that occur 
when the system intervenes with information flows. So that the financial system will be 
unable to perform its channeling of funds from savers to the most productive 
opportunities of investment. The severe case of financial instability is the breakdown of 
almost all systems of finance in the financial market. The inability of financial 
intermediaries to produce information and channel funds to productive investment 
declines the overall economic activity.   
Crockett (1997), who defined financial stability from the application of both institutions 
and markets, represented the second school of thought. Financial stability is a situation 
that determines the ability of financial systems to resist shocks without allowing ways to 
cumulative process, that impair the transformation of accumulated saving to the most 
efficient investment opportunities. Key institutions of the financial system need to be 
stable for achieving overall financial stability in the economy. The result will be fruit full 
as it guarantees a higher degree of confidence to participants of the system in order to 
meet their contractual obligations without third-party guidance and intervention. In 
addition, financial stability needs the stability of key markets. In the stable financial 
market, participants can confidently transact with the price that reflects fundamental 
forces and that does not change every time without substantial change in the 
fundamentals.  
Schinasi (2004) suggested five basic principles that should be considered when we define 
financial stability. First, the topic of financial stability denotes a large idea, containing 
different features of the financial system as infrastructure, institutions, and markets. 
Second, financial stability includes a suitable operation for the system of payment, in 
addition to saving mobilization, risk management, and efficiency in resource allocation, 
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and assistance of welfare maximization. Third, it is not correct to link financial stability 
only with the absence of financial crises, but also with the ability of the system to limit 
the imbalances and the contagion phenomenon. Fourth, financial stability has to be 
structured depending on its impact and its consequence on the real economy. Fifth, the 
analysis of financial stability can be made when it stands for a continuous phenomenon. 
The main sources of risks might be either endogenous or exogenous sources are very 
important for financial decisions and policies which can be implemented to use them. If 
the risk arises from financial institutions, financial markets, and infrastructure, it is said 
to be the endogenous source. 
Sources of risks from financial institutions 
Financial institutions are the ones to be a source for risks and vulnerabilities. Risks may 
affect several institutions that have identical exposures or the shock may initially arise 
from one single institution and spread over other parts of the financial system. Sources 
like credit, liquidity, interest rate, market and currency are among the examples (see table 
2.1 below for the details). The process of intermediating funds from savers to investors 
by financial institutions will be limited if credit risks, market risks, liquidity risks, interest 
rate risks, and foreign currency exposures are exist. The vulnerability of financial 
institutions for legal, operational, and reputation risk leads to an adverse effect on the 
development of sectors. The sensitivity of financial institutions on business strategies and 
a concentration of exposures fall capital that in turn decreases the absorption capacity of 
institutions (Glossop,2011).   
Sources of risks from financial markets 
Changes in market prices, especially in interest rate and foreign exchange rates is the 
second sources of risks from markets because they provide alternative means of finance 
for non-financial sectors. Besides, financial markets systematically link financial 
institutions and they are a place to directly link savers and investors. As it is indicated in 
the summary table 2.1 below, counter-party risk and asset-price misalignment are the 
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best examples of market risks. Financial markets are also exposed to Runs and contagion. 
Asset price volatility is one important form of volatility (Wyplosz, 1998).  
Sources of risks from infrastructure  
Endogenous sources of risk might be through infrastructure, which is an important 
source of risk. Infrastructures link participants in the market and facilitate the operation 
of financial institutions and the market. Institutional vulnerabilities originate from 
financial system participants in a time of payment system, risks in financial institutions 
arise in relation to clearing and settlement. Some of the examples of infrastructural risks 
are a failure in operation, risks of concentration and domino effects, and weakness in the 
legal system and accounting system (Wolfson, 1999). 
 Sources of risks might be exogenous, such types of sources for risk are risks originated 
from outside of the financial system. Sudden introduction or withdrawal of trade 
restrictions, political instabilities, and natural disasters are among the examples of 
exogenous sources of risks.  Vulnerabilities may arise at the macroeconomic level or 
microeconomic level. Macro-economic policy imbalances, technological innovations, and 
oil price shocks are sources of macroeconomic risks. Exogenous vulnerabilities raised 
from macroeconomic shocks affect financial stability because the imbalance can pose 
risks on the economy and on the financial actors. On the other hand, stable and well-
performing macroeconomics is vital for maintaining financial stability and for achieving 
the financial obligations of financial actors like government, households, and companies. 
Moreover, there are microeconomic situations that undermine the confidence of markets 
and creates imbalances overall financial system such as failures in large companies 







Table 2. 1: Summary of sources of risk for financial stability 
 
 





• Financial risks 
  Credit 
  Market 
  Liquidity 
  Interest rate 
  Currency 
• Operational risk 
• Information technology weaknesses 
• Legal or integrity risk 
• Reputation risk 
• Business strategy risk 
• Concentration risk 
• Capital adequacy risk 
 
Market based 
• Counterparty risk 
• Asset price misalignment 
• Run on markets 
      Credit 




• Clearance, payment, and settlement system 
risk 
• Infrastructure fragilities 
   Legal 
   Regulatory 
   Accounting 
   Supervisory 
• Collapse of confidence leading to runs 




• Economic environment risk 
• Policy imbalances 
 
Event risk 
• Natural disaster 
• Political events 
• Large business failures 
 




Definition of Financial Regulation 
Financial regulations are governing laws that guide banks, investment firms, and 
insurance companies, which mainly designed to safeguard participants of the financial 
system from financial risk and fraud. The two main reasons for the implementation of 
financial regulations are to increase the information availability of investors and to 
guarantee the soundness of the financial system (Shaddady and Moore, 2019). 
Types of financial regulations: 
There are six types of financial regulations. Macroeconomic, allocative, structural, 
prudential, organizational, and protective. Each regulation has its own objective and key 
policy instruments, which is  presented in table 2.2.  
A centralized body for reducing risks in the bank mainly executes global banking 
regulation known as Basel Accord. It is mainly systematic risk reduction. This is to avoid 




















Objectives Key policy instruments 
1.  Macroeconomic -To maintain control over 
aggregate economic activity 
- To maintain internal and 
external balance 
Reserve requirement, direct credit 
and deposit ceilings, interest rate 
controls, restrictions on foreign 
capital 
2.  Allocative 
 
-To influence the allocation of 
financial resources in favor of 
priority activities. 
Selective credit allocation, 
Compulsory investment 
requirements, preferential interest 
rates. 
3.  Structural -To control the action of 
dominant firms that exercise 
possible abuse of monopoly 
power 
Restrictions in function and 
geography. Controls like merger 
and entry.  
4.  Prudential 
 
- To maintain the confidence of 
the public in systemic stability 
and prevent the soundness and 
safety of individual financial 
institutions. 
Authorization criteria, minimum 
requirements of capital, limits on 
the concentration of risks, reporting  
requirements. 
5.  Organizational 
 
-To ensure smooth functioning 
and integrity of financial markets 
and information exchanges. 
Disclosure of market information, 
minimum technical standards, rule 
of market making and participation. 
6.  Protective 
 
-To provide protection to users 
of financial services, especially 
consumers and nonprofessional 
investors. 
Information disclosure to 
consumers, compensation funds, 
ombudsmen to investigate and 
resolve disputes. 
Source: (Khan and Khan, 2007) 
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2.1.2 Basel Accord 
 
Governors of the central bank from the group of 10 countries formed the Basel Committee 
of banking regulations and supervisory practices at the end of 1974. Regular meetings 
have been held since the first meeting took place in February 1975. Central bank 
representatives from member countries of G10 have formal responsibility for bank 
supervision.  
The first announcement on the international bank's settlement is formulated in 1988 by 
the Basel Committee on Banking supervision (BCBS). The calculation of capital that 
commercial banks have to hold in order to defend themselves from credit risk is mainly 
stressed by Basel I. Amendments were made on the Basel accord since the establishment 
of the committee. The first amendment takes place in 1996, this amendment is the first to 
introduce bankbooks. It states the importance of the separation of bankbook and trading 
book. Banks have to prepare their separate books with the principle of each book contains 
different elements. Bank booking contains loans, personal accounts, and other 
industrials. Whereas the trading book contains the daily-revalued instruments of 
derivatives like swap and options, bonds, and stocks (Omondi, 2015).  
The amendment calculates capital buffer for the trading book using the Value at Risk 
(VaR) calculation measure. The method of this calculation takes N=10 and X=99. It can 
be interpreted as over a 10-day period revaluation, only 1% is expected to be exceeded. 
After calculating their VaR, banks will make the reporting statement “The loss of our 
bank will not be more than V dollars for the coming days, we are X% certain of that” 
(Ibid).  
Basel Accords are the most influential and misunderstood agreements in modern 
international finance. Accords give harmonized regulations, banking supervisions and 
capital adequacy standards all over the world. However, any misunderstanding of the 
accord leads to misinterpretation and misuse of those regulations and supervisions 
causing political consequences in the economy (Martha, 2009).  
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Basel I has only one pillar that is minimum capital requirements. This requirement is 
suggested for all internationally active banks and other non-member banks of the Basel 
committee, but want to be strict in their banking regulations.  
The establishment of Basel II in 2004 brought a new intuition on the protection of bank 
failures. Around 100 countries that already adopted Basel I accord started the 
implementation of Basel II in 2007. This standard banking regulation restricted the 
minimum capital required for bank management from losses. The Basel II announced the 
strongest bank risk management suggestion of risks raised from the credit, market, and 
operational risks (Mewngi, 2009).  
Credit risk exists when borrowers fail to refund their borrowings, the market risk is 
volatility in banks portfolio due to change market factors and operational risks is a source 
of risk resulted from banks inefficient internal process system, people or external events 
like natural disasters and robbery (Herring, 1999). 
Basel II has three pillars for safeguarding internationally active banks from the 
aforementioned risks. The pillars are namely Pillar I minimum capital requirement, pillar 
II, bank supervision, and pillar III, market discipline. The three pillars are the basis for 
Basel II to maintain financial stability. For capital to risk-weighted assets, banks have to 
have greater than 8% for fulfilling the first pillar of Basel II. Basel II has two measures of 
risks associated with regulatory capital. These are standard approach and internal 
ratings-based approach. In order to measure the risks of banks' assets, banks may use 
either a standard approach given by the Basel committee or use their own internal ratings 
(Martha, 2009). The regulatory capital is amended based on Basel I. The bank's profile on 
risk assets is studied to decide on the allocation of minimum capital requirements. 9% is 
a minimum capital adequacy ratio that all banks should have to hold.  In order to 
implement Basel II, banks need to get greater than 20% of share abroad (Mewngi, 2014).  
It has been particularly observed that far-reaching efforts on reform for extensive 
modifications in international banking regulations (Jones and Knaack, 2019). Besides, the 
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financial reform has a significant improvement in the solvency and liquidity 
requirements of banks in the global system. The member countries of the G20 reacted to 
the global financial crises with a new agenda for regulating banks, this framework is 
commonly known as Basel III. This Basel III promotes both the quality and quantity of 
banking capital, announces two liquidity and one leverage ratio (Co-Pierre, 2011).   




Year Regulation Objectives 
Basel I 
 




Set of minimum capital 
requirements for banks to 
address banks credit risk 
Strength the soundness and 
stability of international banks 
Reduce competitive inequality 
among them 
Basel II 2004 
Implemented 
from 2007  
Mandatory requirement of 
more capital on hand  for 
banks holding riskier asset 
Mandatory disclosure of risky 
investments and risky 
management practices 
International convergence of 
capital measurement and 
capital standard 
Increase in quality and 
stability of international banks 
Maintaining the level playing 
ground for active banks 
Promotion of the adoption of 
stringent practices in risk 
management 
Basel III 2010 Capital conservation buffer 
Countercyclical buffer 
Leverage ratio 
Liquidity ratio (Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio & Net Stable 
Funding Ratio) 
Improve banks’ ability to deal 
with financial stress 
Improve risk management 
Strength banks transparency 
Foster resilience to reduce risk 
of system-wide shocks 
Source: Own summary 
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2.1.3 Basel implementation in Kenya 
 
The focus of Basel I in 1988 was capital adequacy and credit risk. The implementation of 
Basel I in Kenya has taken place in the year 1994. The requirements of the minimum 
capital adequacy ratios are 8 %. This is as a minimum weighted risk of capital adequacy 
ratio. In 1996, the Central Bank of Kenya amends the limit of borrowers to core capital 
ratio from 100 % to 25%. The adoption of this regulation has mainly the objective of 
reduction in the burden of a single borrower, as the previously applied rate was (100%) 
and results in loan default. Minimum capital requirements of banks were regulated 
according to the recommendation of Basel I and the requirement increased from Kenya 
shilling of 200 million to 250 million. In 1997, the structural transformation has taken 
place in the Central Bank of Kenya for reducing political intervention by higher officials 
of the countries ministry of finance. The power of appointing Central Bank directors 
transferred to the President from the ministry of finance. This is because the direct 
appointment of directors was the responsibility of the finance minister that was 
vulnerable to political interference and corruption. Following the failures of many banks 
in 1998, banks were requested to disclose their detailed report on provision for non-
performing loans and to realese a published report of their account to the public since 










Table 2. 4: Summary of capital requirement regulations in Kenya 
 
Year Regulation Minimum requirement 
1994 Core capital to total risk weighted asset 
ratio 
8% 
1996 Total capital to total risk weighted assets 
ratio 
12% 
2000 Core capital to total deposit ratio 8% 
2012 Core capital 1 billion Kenya Shelling ($12 million) 
2013 Capital conservation buffer 2.5% Core capital to total risk 
weighted assets ratio: 10.5% 
Total capital to  risk weighted 
assets ratio: 14.5% 
 Source: (Gudmundsson et al, 2013) 
Although Basel II is introduced in 2004, the Central Bank of Kenya adopted it in 2005. It 
took 3 years to assess the status of banks in Kenya and to make a discussion on the 
implementation procedures of the regulation with stakeholders. In 2008, the minimum 
capital requirement was proposed and the bank supervisory guidance framework was 
introduced. Implementation of Basel II is not mandatory for non-member countries of the 
Basel committee. This is because the implementation required full adoption of Basel I of 
credit risk (Omondi, 2015). 
The full implementation of Basel II is started in Kenya since the year of 2013. The three 
pillars implemented accordingly by the country’s banks.  The third pillar implemented 
in 2006. Banks started quarterly disclosure of their financial statement starting from this 
year. In addition, the Central bank of Kenya implemented pillar I of Basel II 
recommendation on capital adequacy requirements since 2013. Pillar three of Basel II 
implemented in 2015, this pillar is about bank supervisory guidance (CBK, 2020).  
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The 2007/09 financial crisis resulted from the collapse of the Lehman brothers in 2008. 
The main pushing factor for the establishment of the new Basel regulation (Basel III) is 
the collapse of banks after the global financial crisis. Kenya adopted the liquidity 
measurement standard and capital conservation buffers of 2.5 % since 2013. Therefore, 
the core capital to total risk weighted asset ratio became 10.5% and total capital to risk 
weighted assets ratio became 14.5 % (Radha, 2017). 
The major financial regulation variables of this paper are developed from the three Basel 
implementations in the case study under consideration. These variables are the Capital 
adequacy ratio that measures the overall capital regulations, bank supervisory guidance 
measured by the supervisory quality index of Kenya, and liquidity coverage ratio.  
2.1.4 Basel implementation challenges in Kenya 
 
Jones and Knaack (2019), observed five challenges of Basel implementation in LICs and 
LMICs.  
The first obstacle that faces these countries is the gap in infrastructural facilities that are 
directly related to financial development. The Basel II and Basel III standards required 
financial system developments, well-organized and deeply performing stock markets for 
its implementation. However, these requirements are not available or are limited in 
number, or are not sufficient to meet Basel requirements.  
The second challenge is that most of the regulations and minimum requirements are less 
relevant for LMICs.  Fluctuations in the financial systems are less observable in LMICs as 
the systems are not well-functioning.  The third obstacle is  scarce resources in developing 
countries for timely implementation of bank supervisory guidance. Bank supervision and 
public disclosure of banks financial report needs advanced information technologies and 
new training and hiring of new staffs. This increases the costs of the banking sector and 
may discourage adopting the regulation.  
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The fourth constraint is a human resource and exacerbated information asymmetry 
between supervisors and banks. Highly qualified supervisors are required to predict 
credit risks that challenge LMICs to find motivated and strong supervisors to meet the 
risk management system. Lastly, banks that already implement Basel II and III faces 
deterioration of credit composition. The regulations forced to banks to shift their portfolio 
that may negatively affect the financial inclusion of the economy.  
Mewngi (2014) stated that the Basel implementation challenges in Kenya are lack of 
reliable data and information, development of the sound risk-management system, 
asymmetry in supervision, operational cost, access to finance, and market imperfection.  
As indicated by Kombo and Njuguna (2017), the main challenges for Kenyan commercial 
banks for the implementation of Basel III are, lack of adequate staffs on CBK, lack of 
adequate systems for supervision on the implementation of new regulations, limitations 
on regulation, risks on additional capital and finance management culture, and other 
growth barriers. According to Radha (2017), Most of the recommendations of Basel III are 
not implemented by Kenya. To mention them: Contingency capital ratios, net stable 
funding ratio, and guidelines on systematically important banks. He suggested that the 
non-conducive financial system environment is a challenge for accurate measure and 
adequate supervision of banking systems in Kenya especially to control market risk. 
2.2 EMPERICAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Different studies have been conducted on financial regulation and financial stability in 
developing countries. Alici and Ozgoker (2006) studied the power of financial regulation 
adopted by Turkey for strengthening financial stability throughout the liberalization 
process. Researchers assessed the effect of minimum capital requirements and liquidity 
requirements of Basel committee recommendations in Turkey. Mwega (2014) conducted 
a study on financial regulation and financial stability in Kenya, the study focused also on 
balancing inclusive growth. The study investigated the relationship between financial 
regulation and financial stability in Kenya’s financial market with their potential 
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contribution to inclusive growth. The paper analyzed the internal financial regulations 
and their merits and demerits of these regulations for maintaining financial stability in 
Kenya.  
Both studies mentioned above used descriptive statistics for measuring the effectiveness 
of financial regulations for safeguarding financial stability in Turkey and in Kenya. This 
study examines the effect of financial regulation on the financial stability of Kenya by 
Applying the Structural Vector Autoregressive model. A quarterly time-series data 
ranging from 1995 Q1 to 2019 Q4 is considered for analysis purposes.   
 
Shaddady and Moore (2019) used CAMEL- DEA quantile regression for investigating the 
effects of financial regulation and supervision on bank stability. The study was conducted 
on 47 countries by using unbalanced panel data of 2210 banks. The data collected ranges 
from 2000-2016. The explained variable of this model was bank stability and proxies by 
CAMELS. Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management efficiency, Earning quality, 
Liquidity, and Sensitivity to market risk are the variables used in the study to measure 
financial stability. The independent variables are, core profitability model, capital 
regulation index, activity restrictions, deposit insurance, private monitoring index, 
official supervisory power, government owned banks, business freedom index and 
macro-economic variables of GDP and inflation. Main variables like capital adequacy 
ratio, bank supervisor index, and Liquidity coverage ratio of the current study adopted 




















Turkey Descriptive statistics to 
assess the Basel 
recommendations of 
liquidity and capital 
requirements in turkey.  
 
The results of implemented financial 
regulations and liberalization process 
failed to achieve the intention of 
policies. Very limited usefulness of 
those policies to control risks in the 
financial system. 
Mwega (2014) Kenya 
 
Case study to 
investigate the tradeoff 
between financial 
regulation and financial 
stability of financial 
sectors in Kenya.   
The countries Central Banks mainly 
focuses on micro prudential 
regulations and less on macro 
prudential regulations, which shows 
the financial stability of the financial 
system as a whole. Kenya regulates 
banks mainly based on accords of 
Basel I and Basel II. The new 
implementation of Basel III is 
introduced to sectors in January 2013.  
 Shaddady 




Panel data of 2210 
banks ranging from 
2000-2016. CAMELS 
rating system is applied 
to quantile regressions. 
Greater capital regulation affects 
financial stability positively. Adverse 
effects on banks stability is occurred 
due to tighter restrictions, deposit 
insurance, and excess of supervision.   
 
Having been motivated from the work of previous studies on the financial regulation and 
financial stability, this paper tries to fill gaps on the existing literature, time and 
methodology. The study conducted by Mweng (2014) is in the same case area of this 
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project. This paper provides the latest information on the trends of financial stability of 
Kenya as the study with a similar topic in Kenya is conducted in 2014.  In addition, this 
project examines areas that were not touched by the previous paper in Kenya. The 
previous study in the case of Kenya by Mwega (2014) assessed only internal financial 
regulations. Whereas this paper examine both the international and internal financial 
regulations. The project briefly discuss the Basel measures and their effectiveness as well 
as implementation challenges in Kenya. This study used Structural Vector 
Autoregressive approach to evaluate the effectiveness of implemented financial 























3. OVERVIEW OF FINANCIAL SYSTEM IN KENYA 
 
This section briefly describes the study area, the performance of financial system using 
the basic characteristics like financial depth, access and efficiency and the trend analysis 
for the major financial variables of the analysis.  
3.1 Description of the study area 
 Kenya is an East African country with a total area coverage of 580, 367 square kilometers, 
and a total population of around 54 million, as it was reported by the UN (2020). The 
country’s GDP was 101,048 billion dollars in 2020. Major economic activities in Kenya can 
be categorized under agriculture, manufacturing, and service sectors that make the 
country’s economy the third-largest economy in Sub-Saharan African countries after 
Nigeria and South Africa. 
The financial system in Kenya is lightly regulated and there is a relatively open capital 
account (Mwega, 2014). There are more than 14 foreign banks, dynamic stock exchange, 
derivatives, and security exchange markets that resulted from the conducive 
environment of the financial system in Kenya (Gottschalk, 2015). In the work by 
Brownbridge and Kirkpatrick (2010), classification of sub-Saharan African countries was 
made having yardstick criteria of the status of bank supervision. The researchers 
suggested that bank supervision in Kenya is well-designed and effectively implemented. 
The central bank of Kenya regulates banks of the country using Basel Accords mainly for 
guaranteeing financial stability in the country (Githinj, 2016). Central Bank of Kenya 
(CBK) is an independent institution that is free from any influence and intervention for 
exercising its power and it is not directed or controlled by any person or authority 
(Radha,2017). 
3.2 Characteristics of financial system in Kenya 
 
In the work of Chiak et al (2012), four features of measuring financial institutions and 
financial markets are given. These four characteristics are proxies for the services 
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rendered by actors in the financial system. The first feature is the size of financial 
institutions and financial markets (financial depth). Access to financial institutions and 
financial markets is the second characteristics that measures the extent of the use of 
financial institutions and markets by citizens. Thirdly, the efficiency of the provision of 
services on the financial institutions and financial markets. The last characteristics is 
Stability. In this section, financial depth, access and efficiency of financial institutions and 
financial markets in Kenya are assessed as they measure the status of financial system 
development for a given country. Showing the trend of financial stability indicators is 
one objective of this study that is presented in the next subsection.  
Indicators to capture depth, access, efficiency and stability are different for financial 
institutions and financial markets. This difference is illustrated in Table 3.1 below that 
presents the indicators selected for the evaluation (Čihák, et al, 2012; Setiawan, 2015).     
Table 3.1: Variables for measuring depth , access, efficiency and stability 
 
 FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL MARKETS 
DEPTH -Private credit by deposit money 
banks to GDP (%) 
-Stock Market capitalization to GDP 
ACCESS -Accounts per 1000 Adults.  
-Bank Branches per 100,000 adults.  
-ATMS per 100,000 adults. 
 




STABILITY -z-score (distance to default) -Stock Price volatility 
Source: WB, GFDD database 
3.2.1 Financial depth  
 
Important indicators of depth in the case of financial institutions and financial markets 
are assessed for evaluating the financial system performance of Kenya.  
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Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP (%) and M2/GDP 
These indicators used to measure the size of financial institutions in Kenya. Private credit 
by deposit money banks to GDP (%) measures the provision of financial resources by 
domestic money banks specifically to the private sector as a percentage share of GDP. 
Commercial banks and other financial institutions are among the components of 
domestic money banks that accept transfer deposits such as demand deposits. Kamba 
(2010) used broad Money (M2) to GDP ratio for measuring the financial sector 
performance and depth of countries. The paper also mentioned that M2/GDP is the first 
and commonly used ratio that measures financial development. This indicator measured 
the profitability and size of the banking sector.  
Figure 3.1: Trends of private credit to GDP (%) and M2/GDP 
 
Source: WB, GFDD database 
Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP (%) in Kenya is below the average of Low-
Middle Income countries (LMICs) and above Low-Income countries (LICs) throughout 
the period under consideration. This indicator shows an increasing trend from 1994 to 
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below the value of LMICs (25.63%) and more than a double of LICs (8.31%). From 2000 
to 2008, the private credit to GDP ratio has a decreasing trend due to the surrounding 
uncertainty following the national election of the country in 2002. The world financial 
crises contributes to the lower value of this indicator in 2007, it was 21.3% and still lags 
behind the value of LMICs (36.54%) and beyond LICs (11%). The highest ratio of this 
indicator in Kenya is observed in 2015 (31.9%). In 2017, the average value for LMICs was 
43.90%, 29.90% in Kenya and it was 12.86 % in LICs. 
The broad money (M2) to GDP ratio of Kenya ranges from 29.58% to 43.25% for the study 
period under consideration. As it is indicated in figure 3.1, LMICs has continuously 
increasing trend of M2/GDP ratio after 2010. Where as in Kenya, it declines from 42.43 
in 2015 to 36.18 in 2019. Therefore, it can be concluded that Kenya is far behind from the 
average of its income group implying that the financial sector is not developed in 
comparison to LMICs and well-developed in relative to LICs.    
Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) 
 Financial markets have a role in promoting economic growth through intermediation, 
domestic saving mobilization, resource allocation, and fostering capital inflows. In 
addition, the role of the banking sector is supplemented by the stock market through the 
provision of liquidity, reduction of transaction costs, risk transfer, price discovery, and 
reduction of information cost. Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE) is the stock market in 
Kenya, which is the most developed stock market in Eastern and Central African 
countries and young and developing in comparison to the international standards 
(Nyasha and Odhiambo, 2014).    
Unlike the previous indicator, this indicator used to measure the financial depth of the 
financial market of Kenya. It is a value for all listed shares to GDP ratio, which shows the 
size of the stock markets relative to the economy (Beck and Levine, 2002).  
Figure 3.2 reveals that the stock market capitalization to GDP ratio of Kenya has a 
fluctuating trend. It is continuously increasing from 1992 to 1994 and starts decline after 
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1995. The lowest values are registered in 1990 and 2001. Lack of transparency and 
accountability in bids, bureaucratic law and order qualities and corruption are possible 
reasons for the low performance during those years. After 2002 it continuously increasing 
and reaches, it’s maximum in 2007. The increase in stock market liquidity, institutional 
quality after critical reform on the sector, and development of banking sector contributes 
to the improvement of this indicator. In addition, serious of incentives such as a favorable 
tax regimes were put in place to encourage investments in the NSE. The figure shows that 
this indicator has a positive increasing value after 2015. The value of Kenya’s stock market 
capitalization to GDP ratio was 20% in 2003 and it was 38.7% for LMICs. For the year 
2007, the value in LMICs was 34% and it is recorded as 40% in Kenya. In 2017, the average 
of LMICs is equal to the value of Kenya, which was 37%. It can be said that, Kenya has a 
promising performance in this indicator in comparison to LMICS. 
Figure 3.2: Trends of stock market capitalization to GDP (%) 
 
                Source: WB, GFDD database 
3.2.2 Financial access 
 
One of the ambitions that have often motivated the creation of fashion financial systems 







































































households, businesses, entrepreneurs, and states. We can say that capital is the blood 
that circulates in the economy and smooths economic transactions. An operational and 
efficient financial system makes it possible to reduce market frictions by providing a 
range of useful services to its users. Therefore, access to financial services in an economy 
gives us a lot of information about its level of development.  
Figure 3.3: Trends of access indicators 
 
 
                  Source: WB, GFDD database 
To measure the financial access of Kenya, indicators of financial institutions from 2004-
2017 are used. The financial market data is not available in the source dataset. Indicators 
are specified with their first name in the figure 3.3. Bank account is measured with bank 
accounts per 1,000 Adults. Bank branch stands for bank branches per 100,000 adults and 
ATMs per 100,000 adults are represented by ATM. The two vertical lines are the Basel 
implementation years in Kenya. 
The blue line is a representation of bank account per 1000 adults. In Kenya, the value for 
this indicator is continuously increasing. This increase is driven by per capita income and 
popularization of new information and communication technologies, in particular, 
















2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
Access indicators
Bank Account Bank Branch ATM
28 
 
and the maximum number of bank accounts per 1000 adults is in 2017 with the value of 
1315.63. The lowest record in Kenya is 2004 (122.694) and the reason is lack of financial 
literacy and the level of inequalities as Shawn et al. (2011) explain. Households with poor 
financial literacy tend not to open accounts and use informal means to borrow money or 
save.  
The orange line in figure 3.3 represents bank branches per 100,000 adults for Kenya from 
2004 to 2017. The trend shows that there is almost constant value in the opening of bank 
branches in Kenya from 2004 to 2017. (From 2 to 5.5). This result can be explained by the 
revival of e-Banking (FinTech, AssurTech) in recent years and the effects of Basel 
regulations on minimum capital requirements of banks to the banking sector. 
ATM1  per 100,000 adults is drawn with the green line in the figure 3.3. ATMs are 
increasingly widespread after 2006 and reach at its maximum in 2014 (around 10 ATM 
machines per 100,000 adults) in Kenya. ATM allows banks to make cash easily accessible 
to their customers. Banking sector restructuring explains the rise in the ATM service in 
Kenya, but the service is still lagging behind the average of LMICs (it was 16 in 2017). 
3.2.3 Financial efficiency 
 
Efficiency of Banks and financial markets measures the performance of the financial 
systems. The efficiency of financial institutions resulted from reforms in the banking 
sector and strong regulations on financial frameworks. Technological advancement and 
adoption of information technologies in the provision of banking services play a great 
role in the promotion of financial institutions and market efficiency. Chiak et al (2012), 
indicate that the first indicators of financial efficiency are net interest margin for financial 




1 Automated Teller Machine. 
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Net interest margin 
A positive value of this indicator is an implication for the profitability of an institution 
and a negative result is an indication of loss or inefficiency of an investment. Net interest 
margin is calculated as the difference between net interest incomes of firms with the 
outgoing interest that the firm pays. The net interest is generated from loans and 
mortgages while the interest is paid or deposits and saving accounts. Transaction risks of 
banks contributed to the existence of net interest margin (Saksonova, 2014). This indicator 
is analyzed using data ranging from 1996 to 2017. The value of this indicator in Kenya is 
positive for the period of study under consideration. The vertical lines are drawn for 
observing the effect of Basel regulation in the country and the lines represent he Basel 
implementation years. There is an inverse relationship between a higher net interest 
margin and bank efficiency. The lowest margin is registered in 1998 (5.2%). The 2007/08 
financial crisis influenced the net interest margin of Kenya as the value falls in 2008. In 
2005, the net interest margin is registered to be 11% that reflects both default and interest 
rate premiums. 
Figure 3.4: Trends of net interest margin 
 
 













Stock market turnover ratio 
This indicator is the first indicator that measures the efficiency of financial markets in 
Kenya. It is calculated as the ratio of the total traded value of domestic shares to the 
average stock market capitalization.  The highest value is registered in 2006 and the value 
was 14.8. The lowest value is recorded in 1993 with the value of 1.34. Construction of 
modern information center, computerization and electronic trading enhances the growth 
and development of NSE contributes for the highest value.  The market turnover ratio is 
highly volatile except for the years from 2012 to 2016. This indicates that the stock market 
in Kenya has a dynamic fluctuation and responsive to shocks in the determinants. The 
value falls from 8.8 in 2007 to 5.8 in 2008 due to the world financial crisis. After a 
permanent increase for the years ranging from 2012 to 2018, it falls to 1.88 in 2019 due to 
liquidity problem that causes investors to concentrate their funds only about half of the 
listed stocks.  
Figure 3.5: Trends of stock market turnover ratio 
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The value of 2019 in Kenya was the lowest rate from LMICs. The average of LMICs in 
this indicator for the year 2019 was 14.96. The lowest stock market turnover ratio during 
this year is justified by the difficult business conditions that faced companies involved in 
the stock market industry due to Covid19 pandemic. This indicates that the financial 
market of the country is not efficient as it is experienced volatilities and lower rates of 
key indicators 
3.3 Trends of financial stability indicators 
The resilience of the financial system to financial stress is financial stability. These 
variable proxies by the first indicator of financial stability given by Čihák, et al (2012), Z 
score (distance to default). It is a commonly used measure for financial stability and this 
sub-section is devoted to reporting the evolution of financial institutions of Kenya from 
1995 to 2019. Z score is calculated as (k+μ)/δ, where k is equity capital to assets ratio, μ 
is the return on asset (ROA) and δ is the standard deviation of ROA (volatility of ROA). 
Z score measures the bank's distance from insolvency. In addition, it is an accounting 
measure of the distance to default (World Bank, 2020). As it is indicated by the above 
formula that the volatility is the denominator and the equity capital and ROA are the 
numerators, the higher value of the z-score shows the lower risk of banks and the lower 
score implies a higher risk of banks (Li et al, 2017). 
The vertical lines in the figure 3.6 below shows years of Basel implementations in the case 
study. It is observed that there is a persistent positive value for z-score that is fluctuating 
from 13 to 22 for the study period under consideration. The figure revealed that the 
implementation of Basel Accord has positive effect on the financial stability of Kenya as 
there is a higher increment in the value of this indicator after the years of Basel 
implementation, 2006 and 2013. The sharp decline in 2008, 2010 is due to the global 
financial crises that results higher bankruptcies in commercial banks of the country and 
biggest rate of  non-performing loan. According to the financial stability report of Central 
Bank of Kenya (2020), there was a stable and resilient financial sector in the country. The 
growth of total assets for the financial sectors grew by 9.9%. Liquidity improved to 53.3% 
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and it was calculated as the ratios of current assets to current liabilities. Profit of firms is 
promoted by 8.5 % in the year 2019. In the first half of the 2020, the growth of total asset 
was registered as 8.3 % whereas profitability has declined by around 25.6%, on the other 
hand, 56.5 % increment is registered from liquidity. Generally, the descriptive statistics 
reveals that financial stability variable has visible difference for the years’ pre and post-
Basel implementation. This result will be checked by using financial regulation variables 
in the econometrics analysis of the next section. 
Figure 3.6: Trends of z-score 
 
                    Source: WB, GFDD database 
Stability of Kenya’s financial markets measured by stock market volatility from 2009 to 
2019. Stock price volatility is measured using only 11 years data due to lack of data 
availability. There is a sharp fall after the highest value was registered in 2009. The core 
reasons are the effect of financial crises that hatted the  NSE and the domestic crises arose 
from the post-election violence brought along by political instability. After 2012, this 
indictor is registered as stable up to 2015 because the country formed Automated Trading 















Figure 3.7: Trends of stock market volatility 
 
                      Source: WB, GFDD database 
 
3.4 Relationship between financial stability and financial regulations in Kenya 
 
Capital regulation variable 
Banks' capital relative to risk-weighted assets ratio is represented by the horizontal line 
in the figure 3.8 below. It shows the minimum capital requirement that banks hold 
because it allows banks and financial institutions to have enough capital in order to resist 
operating losses. In addition, capital adequacy to risk-weighted asset ratio helps to 
promote financial stability and efficiency through financial systems. The horizontal black 
line in figure 3.8 below represents the minimum capital requirement of Basel regulation. 
The overall relationship between capital regulation and financial stability is 
indeterminate. For the years 1995, 2001-2003, the capital adequacy ratio was below the 
minimum requirement. For the remaining years, it is reported that the value is above the 
minimum requirement. From 2004-2013, capital regulation and financial stability go 
positively. After 2013, the two variables are highly volatile and negatively commove. In 
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have a positive relationship. This relationship will be checked by the econometrics 
analysis of the next section.  
Figure 3.8: Relationship of financial stability and capital requirement regulation 
 
    
                      Source: IMF and WB data 
 
Liquidity requirement Variable 
Minimum liquidity requirements make banks able to increase assets and allow them to 
meet obligations as they fall due. Basel regulation on the minimum liquidity requirement 
is due to its importance for maintaining financial stability. Because the lack of liquidity 
results systemic risk in the banking sector due to interconnected operations. 
After the collapse of Chase bank Ltd in 2016, the CBK controlled liquidity. Low liquidity 
holding leads banks to a serious restriction from getting access to intraday liquidity, 
discount government securities, open market operation, and lender of last resort 
window.  
Liquidity ratio in Kenya was above the minimum requirement until 2013. The ratio falls 
below the requirement after 2013 and back to above the minimum requirement after 2019. 
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liquidity requirement and z-score. This might be due to the liquidity management 
problem of banks during the banks crises happened in the country. 
Figure 3.9: Relationship of financial stability and liquidity requirement regulation 
 
  
                    Source:  IMF and WB data 
 
There was a higher degree of non-performing loan in the country resulted after lack of 
banks aggressive debt collection procedure in the country. An increase in the bad debt 
reduces Return On Asset (ROA). Then profit of banks decreased and it decreases 
liquidity. Then the minimum liquidity requirement regulation does not play a role in the 
stability of financial institutions in Kenya for the period of study under consideration. 
This should be checked by the econometrics result of the following section.  
Bank Supervisory Guidance 
This variable is measured by supervisory quality index. The figure 3.10 below clearly 
shows that the index for Kenya is negative for whole years. The level of supervisory index 
in Kenya is moderate as there are values that are near zero. The maximum is -0.05 and 
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relationship. This regulation is effectively started to implement after 2015 in the country. 
The value of z-score immediately starts to decline after this year. This implies that z- score 
is responsive for the shock in banks supervisory guidance, but this result has to be 
checked in the empirical analysis of section five.   
Figure 3.10: Relationship of financial stability and bank supervision regulation 
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4. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY 
 
The main objective of this paper is to analyze the effectiveness of financial regulation on 
financial stability of Kenya. To this end, model specification, estimation techniques, and 
the type and sources of data for econometric investigation in the next chapter are briefly 
discussed under this chapter.  
4.1 Source and type of data 
 
The main sources of data are both domestic and international sources. Data is collected 
from domestic sources like Central Bank of Kenya (CBK). International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and World Bank (WB) are international sources of data. A quarterly data ranging 
from 1995:1 to 2019:4 was collected to answer the research question of this study. This is 
due to the availability of data. Data of main variables are available in the database of 
source organizations starting from 1995. In addition, the topic of financial regulation and 
financial stability started to get the attention of researchers and policymakers of both 
developing and developed countries after the 1980s. 
Table 4.1: Variables definitions, measurement and sources 
Variables Definition  Unit  Source 
𝒛𝒕 z-score, used to measure 
financial stability.  
Ratio WB 
𝒃𝒄𝒕 Bank capital to total asset ratio. 
Used to measure bank capital 
and bank size. 
Percentage WB 
𝒈𝒕 Regulatory index. Measures 
bank supervisory guidance. 
Index CBK 
𝒍𝒕 Liquid assets to deposit and 
short funding. Used to measure 
liquidity coverage ratio. 
Percentage IMF 
𝒓𝒕 Bank regulatory capital to risk-
weighted assets. Used to 






4.2 Model Specification 
 
The empirical literature review and the descriptive statistics of the previous sections 
shows that financial regulations are effective for financial stability. Therefore, this paper 
specifies an empirical model that is  evaluated using the Structural Vector Autoregressive 
(SVAR) for confirming the effectiveness of financial regulations on the financial stability 
of Kenya.  
Structural Vector Autoregressive (SVAR) model identifies structural shocks from Vector 
Autoregressive (VAR) models. SVAR models are better than other complex simultaneous 
equation models for the analysis of multivariate time series (Hossein and 
Kamuruzzaman, 2015). As it is indicated by Gottschalk (2001), Guay (2001), and 
Blanchard and Quah (1989), SVAR is estimated with the assumption of short-run 
restrictions of the feedback effect of variables contemporaneously. In addition to its 
importance in forecasting and data description, the SVAR model used for policy analysis 
purposes and structural inference and also provides forecasts of superior quality. 
Assumptions related to structural causality of data analysis are imposed and impacts of 
certain unexpected shocks are examined. In the SVAR model, the function of interest and 
causality is mostly analyzed using impulse response functions and variance 
decomposition forecast of the error term (Christiano, 2012).   
The following equation shows the model specification of Structural Vector 
Autoregressive ( SVAR)  model:  
AYt = α0 + α1Yt−1 + Ut ……………………………………………………………… . . (1) 
Where: A is a representation for a matrix of contemporaneous relationships 
              𝐘𝐭 is a representation for vector of endogenous variables 
              𝛂𝟏 is matrix of parameter 
              𝛂𝟎 is a vector for a constant term  
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              𝐔𝐭 Represents structural shocks, it assumed that they satisfy the orthogonal 
assumption of one to the other (explains only one shock at a time, two or more shocks 
cannot exist at the same time) there is also the assumption of no correlation among 
structural shocks. Meaning, the covariance between them is zero. 
The vector of endogenous variables 𝑌𝑡 of equation (1) contains endogenous variables of 
the following form:     
𝑌𝑡= [𝑧𝑡,𝑏𝑐𝑡, 𝑔𝑡,𝑙𝑡,𝑟𝑡] 
Where these vector of endogenous variables include z score (zt), bank capital to total asset 
ratio (bct), regulatory quality index (gt), liquidity assets to deposits and short funding 
ratio (lt), and bank regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets ratio (rt).  
The above five vectors of endogenous variables considered under this study, based on 
theory, literature, and Basel Accord. Crockett (1997), suggested possible variables in the 
theory of financial stability. Bank capital to total asset ratio (bct) is selected for the analysis 
purpose of this model based on this theory. In the work of Mohr and Wagner (2013), all 
variables of this study are used in order to measure the nexus between financial 
regulation and financial stability. Shaddady and  Moore (2019), used bank capital to total 
asset ratio (bct), regulatory quality index (gt), and bank regulatory capital to risk-
weighted assets ratio (rt) for investigating the effect of financial regulation and 
supervision on financial stability. The three Basel regulations are the base for this model 
while we were selecting the financial regulation variables. Akande (2018), used liquidity 
requirement ratio, capital adequacy to risk weighted asset ratio and z score for evaluating 
competition, regulation, stability and efficiency of sub-Saharan African banks. Polizzi 
and Scannella (2020), to measure the role of financial regulation on the financial stability, 
use z score, liquidity requirement and capital adequacy to risk weighted asset ratio.  
Variables ordering is decided based on the result of  the Granger causality test. Therefore, 
Endogenous variables of this paper are ordered as [𝑧𝑡, 𝑏𝑐𝑡, 𝑔𝑡 , 𝑙𝑡, 𝑟𝑡]. Mohr and Wagner 
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(2013) and Akande (2018), followed the same ordering and variable description. The 
paper adopted this ordering because the effectiveness of financial regulation on financial 
stability takes time and financial stability responds to financial regulation with a lag. 
However, the financial regulation variables have a contemporaneous response to 
financial stability.  
Financial variable bank capital ordered next to z-score because it responds to the shock 
of financial stability contemporaneously. The ability of the government and the central 
bank of Kenya for bank supervisory guidance is ordered next to z-score and bank capital. 
The liquidity requirement ratio is the fourth variable that responds contemporaneously 
to financial stability variables and supervisory guidance as it is observed from the 
Granger causality result. Deposit takers’ capital adequacy is measured by capital 
adequacy to the risk weighted assets. This variable is a proxy for all capital regulations 
that ultimately measures the extent of the robustness of financial institutions to various 
shocks in Kenya. It is contemporaneously responsive to the changes in the other 
endogenous variables of the model.  
Introduction of matrix A is the first step in the identification of the Structural Vector 
Autoregressive model. Matrix A implies the contemporaneous relationship of 
endogenous variables of the model.  
Equation (1) above (AYt = α0 + α1Yt−1 + Ut ………………(1)) should be written in 





𝑌𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝑡 
Where,  𝛿0 = 𝐴
−1𝛼0,  𝛿1 = 𝐴
−1𝛼1  
𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡 = 𝐴
−1𝑈𝑡 …………………………………………………..….…. (2) 
𝑡 is residual or forecast error in the reduced VAR form. 
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𝛽31 𝛽32 1 𝛽34 𝛽35
𝛽41 𝛽42 𝛽43 1 𝛽45
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In equation (2) above,( 𝑡 = 𝐴
−1𝑈𝑡) we have said that matrix A relates the forecast error 
of reduced form 𝑡 and the structural shocks 𝑈𝑡. It indicates that the linear combination 
of forecast errors of the structural shocks Guay (2001).The number of variables to be 




restrictions are needed in matrix A. Zero restriction is imposed in matrix A to restrict the 
contemporaneous relations among endogenous variables in SVAR. The restriction is 
imposed both in matrix A and A-1 to show the link between the forecast error and 
structural shocks (Ouliaris et al, 2018). Then, the equation of zero restriction is presented 
below. The total number of variables (n) in this model is five. Using the formula for zero 






















1 0 0 0 0
𝛽21 1 0 0 0
𝛽31 𝛽32 1 0 0
𝛽41 𝛽42 𝛽43 1 0




















According to Ulrichs (2018), the SVAR model helps to estimate the effect of innovations, 
policies, and reforms as a function of the impulse responses to those shocks. It is assumed 
that financial stability is measured by z-score responses to the shocks on the financial 
regulation variables. Equation (1) of the SVAR is transformed into a sum of shocks 
representation of impulse response function. It is represented by equation (4) below. We 
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have to identify or isolate purely exogenous or purely independent shocks to the variable 
of interest and how the financial stability reacts to them is known as impulse responses. 
Indeed, the structural model isolates purely to exogenous shocks and gets the responses 
of the endogenous variables after the economy hits by this shock (Mohr and Wagner, 
2013).  
Impulse response equation:   zt = z0 + ∑ 𝜔𝑖ℎ
∞
𝑖=0 𝑈ℎ(𝑡−𝑖)……… (4) 
Where, zt represents variable of interest, z0 indicates initial conditions, 𝜔𝑖ℎ is the ith 




The z-score (or distance to default) is calculated as (ROA+equity/assets)/sd (ROA), 
where ROA is the average annual return on end-year assets and sd(ROA) is the standard 
deviation of ROA. This variable used to measure the financial stability of Kenya. Different 
studies like Kiemo et al (2019), Alshubiri (2017), Akande (2018), and Mutarindwa et al 
(2020) used Z-score for measuring financial stability in their model of analysis. 
Bank Capital to total asset ratio (%) 
 This variable is calculated as the total capital and reserve of banks to total assets. Capital 
and reserve incorporate funds contributed by owners, retained earnings, general and 
special reserves, provisions, and valuation adjustments. In all countries, tier 1 capital is a 
common feature of their banking system that captures paid-up shares and common stock. 
Tier 2 and tier 3 capital measure for total regulatory capital. Any financial and non-
financial asset can be counted as a total asset.  
Regulatory index 
This variable is the measurement for one of the Basel regulations called bank supervisory 
guidance. It captures the government’s commitment and perception to adopt and 
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implement basic financial regulations that are recommended for the development of 
financial systems. It is an implication for Kenya’s overall score for the adoption and 
implementation of financial regulations. In 2006, the Basel committee formulated 25 
principles for bank supervision. The first principle explains that authorities involved in 
bank supervision should stick to the objective of Basel regulations, should be 
independent, transparent, and cooperative.  The regulatory quality index ranges from -
2.5 to 2.5. If the value is -2.5, the regulatory quality is very weak and the reverse will be 
true for 2.5.  
Liquid assets to deposit and short funding (%) 
This variable is calculated as the ratio of the value of easily convertible liquid assets to 
cash to short-term funding and plus total deposit. Liquidity asset incorporates Cash and 
securities. Total customer deposits like saving accounts, current accounts, and terms are 
short-term funding and deposits. Under short-term borrowing, many market 
instruments, and other deposits are found.  
Bank regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets (%) 
This variable is measured by banks' regulatory capital instruments to risk-weighted asset 
ratio. It is also known as the capital adequacy requirement ratio that measures banks' 
solvency. The higher ratio is an implication for banks' loss absorbance without affecting 
their solvency. The overall capital regulation in this model is measured by this variable. 
It consists of overall capital stringency; capital banks should hold an initial stringency.  
4.3 Time series properties 
 
Before carrying out the estimation of the above models, the time series characteristics of 
each data have to be investigated. This is because the SVAR model works under the 




4.3.1 Stationary test 
 
The SVAR model estimations are based on the assumption that all vectors of endogenous 
variables are stationary. It is common in time-series variables that most of them are not 
stationary. If the mean and the variance are constant over time, stationarity will exist. 
However, the covariance of two consecutive periods cannot be calculated on the actual 
time rather it depends on the gap or lag between two periods. A serious problem occurs 
if the model contains non-stationary variables. This problem is known as spurious 
regression, the result obtained have no economically meaningful causal relations. Non-
stationery variables become stationary by differencing and the process is said to be a 
different stationary process (Harris, 1995).  
In order to test the unit root of variables, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and 
Phillips-Perron (PP) test are applied.  
 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test 
 
Adding the lagged values of the vector of endogenous variables is the procedure for 
taking care of the ADF test. Identification of the problem of autocorrelation in the mean 
of error terms is indirectly checked.  
This is conducted as follows 
∆Yt = α + βt + γYt−1 + δ1∆Yt−2 …+ δp∆Yt−p + 𝑢𝑡 …………(5) 
Where p represents the maximum lag length, 𝛼 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽 indicate coefficients of the time 
trend, 𝑈𝑡 is pure white noise and t is time period.   
 
Phillips-Perron Test (PP) 
The second method to test the unit root of variables is PP. The result and the hypothesis 
of this test is similar to the ADF test, the only difference is, correlation is checked in the 
estimation step in PP. The main drawback of PP is its difficulty to differentiate between 
stationary and non-stationary variables in PP when the sample size is small.  
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ADF and PP test: 
𝐻0:  𝑦𝑡 ~ 𝐼(1) 
𝐻0:  𝑦𝑡~ 𝐼(0) 
There is a unit root in the variable is the null hypothesis of ADF and PP. If the null 
hypothesis is rejected, the variable is said to be stationary (Harris and Sollis 2003). 
The next and most important step after the test of stationary is the decision of lag length 
for the model under consideration. Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) or Schwarz 
Bayesian Criterion (SBC) is the commonly used criteria for selecting a lag length. In this 
study, the model with the smallest AIC or BIC is preferred. BIC is sometimes preferred to 
AIC as it has a property of certainty to select a true model. 
4.3.2 Diagnostic tests 
Finally, it is necessary to do a diagnostic test ( LM test of serial correlation and stability 
tests) on the estimated result of the short-run equation to make sure that the estimated 












5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Section 3 dealt with the trend analysis of variables from empirical models and indicators 
of the financial system. This section presents the result of econometric analysis. 
Specifically, results of Granger causality test,  stationarity (unit root) test, SVAR model 
estimation results, impulse response results, Variance decomposition results and 
robustness test results are discussed.   
5.1 Result of Granger Causality Test 
 
As it is briefly explained in the empirical methodology of the previous section, variables 
ordering of this study is checked with Granger causality. It is observed that policy 
variables are contemporaneously responsive for the change in the financial stability, but 
financial stability is not contemporaneously affected by policy variables. 
Table 5.1: Result of Granger causality test 
Null hypothesis F-Statistics Probability 
bct does not Granger cause zt 0.60615 0.6592 
zt does not Granger cause bct 0.36325 0.0357 
gt does not Granger cause zt 0.01384 0.9996 
zt does not Granger cause gt 4.96286 0.0131 
lt does not Granger cause zt 1.86661 0.1235 
zt does not Granger cause lt 4.83677 0.0014 
rt does not Granger cause zt 0.93042 0.4502 
zt does not Granger cause rt 4.85568 0.0014 
gt does not Granger cause bct 0.11251 0.9778 
bct does not Granger cause gt 0.28095 0.8896 
lt does not Granger cause bct 0.31823 0.8951 
bct does not Granger cause lt 4.07581 0.0045 
rt does not Granger cause bct 1.52224 0.2027 
bct does not Granger cause rt 0.46196 0.7634 
lt does not Granger cause gt 0.20313 0.9360 
gt does not Granger cause lt 4.69325 0.0236 
rt does not Granger cause gt 0.11022 0.9786 
gt does not Granger cause rt 0.24627 0.9112 
rt does not Granger cause lt 1.63143 0.1736 
lt does not Granger cause rt 2.09279 0.0886 
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5.2 Results of Unit Root Test 
 
Unit root test is conducted using both Augmented-Dickey Fuller (ADF) test and Phillip-
Peron (PP) test. The ADF test result reveals that z-score (at 10 % level of significance), 
bank capital to total asset ratio (at 10% level of significance), and bank regulatory capital 
to risk-weighted assets ratio (at 10% level of significance) are stationary at  level. The 
remaining variables are stationary at their first difference and at 1% level of significance. 
The PP test result reported that all variables are stationary at their first difference and at 
1% level of significance (See Appendix 2 for the result table). 
5.3 Report of Optimal Lag Length Selection Criteria 
 
Before conducting the SVAR estimation, the decision on the lag length selection is 
important. This is because SVAR is very sensitive to the order of lags selected for analysis. 
Including many lags leads to an error of forecast and waste in the degree of freedom. 
While the inclusion of a very little number of lags makes the size of the result incorrect. 
All criteria except the Schwarz information criteria (two lags selected), approve the lag 
length of six at a 5% level of significance (See appendix 3 for test result). 
The SVAR estimation starts from estimating the result of Vector Autoregressive (VAR). 
The full result of the VAR model estimation and SVAR estimation results are presented 
in the Appendix 4 and 5. In addition, Diagnostic test results of the model in this paper 
are presented in appendix 6.  
5.4 Impulse Response Results 
 
In this sub section, the result of impulse response function is discussed. The Impulse 
response result for all vector of endogenous variables is reported in Appendix 7.1 below. 
Only selected figures are presented in this section to show the response of financial 
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The response of  z-score to the change 
in the financial variable of bank capital 
to total assets ratio (bct) is economically 
insignificant.  
           Source: Own Computation from EViews 10 
To address the long-run responses of financial stability to shocks in financial regulation 
variables, we use Impulse Response Functions (IRF). We performed the analysis over a 
12-period horizon. The financial stability of Kenya is measured by a z-score. It relates 
negatively to the vulnerability of a bank’s profit. The innovation in financial stability has 
an economically significant effect on the current financial stability of Kenya.  
A dramatic change in bank's prudential- regulation is observed since the world financial 
regulation. Minimum liquidity requirement (lt) is one regulation of the Basel Committee. 
The objective of this requirement is to make banks safer. It has a role in mitigating 
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Response of ZT to BCT
Response to Cholesky One S.D. (d.f. adjusted) Innovations ± 2 S.E.
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management abilities. However,  in Kenya, the response of financial stability for the 
shocks in the minimum liquidity requirement ratio is negative. The result is statistically 
significant, but the sign is unexpected. It is because the regulation requires banks to hold 
more cash that results to issue fewer loans on business and consumers. This leads to 
slower economic growth because companies with better investment opportunities have 
no access to capital during the time they need debt to fund their operations and to expand 
their business. In addition, Kenyan central bank applied a strict regulation on banks with 
a higher minimum liquidity requirements creates an idle liquidity that has no power to 
stabilize the financial sector of the country.  Therefore, liquidity minimum requirement 
regulation does not have financial stability benefits. The result is in line with Hoerova et 
al (2018), Polizzi, and Scannella (2020).  
The change in the capital adequacy ratio (rt) has a significant effect on the financial 
stability of Kenya. A permanent positive response of financial stability for the shocks in 
capital adequacy ratio confirms the financial stability benefit of capital regulation in 
Kenya. In addition, the survival of banks will go up as capital regulations provide 
incentives to better monitor and borrower’s identification. Capital regulations are 
difficult and costly to implement, as information about the true quality of bank balance 
sheets is imperfect. However, in Kenya, the change in this variable is beneficial to 
financial stability. The result is similar to the results found by Shaddady and  Moore 
(2019) and Mwega (2014).  
A shock to bank supervisory guidance (gt) has no statistically significant effect on the 
financial stability of Kenya. This result is due to the inefficient implementation of this 
regulation in the country. As it is indicated in the Basel implementation challenges of 
Kenya (section 2), Bank supervisory guidance requires highly qualified, responsible, 
transparent, and independent authorities. In Kenya, there was the intervention of the 
government in the activities of the countries Central banks.  In addition, as it is reported 
by CBK (2020), non-compliance is noted during the supervisory process. To mention 
some of the requirements violated by the country’s financial institutions: single 
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obligatory limit, prohibited business, capital adequacy requirements, insider lending, 
and liquidity management, restrictions on advances, credit and grantees, and restrictions 
on advances for purchase of land. These implementation problems of bank supervisory 
guidance contributed to its insignificant effect on the financial stability of Kenya. 
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Source: Own Computation from EViews 10 
The study treated bank capital to total assets ratio (bct) as a financial variable that 
determines the financial stability of Kenya. The response of bank capital to total asset 
ratio for minimum liquidity requirement ratio is negative. There is a continues negative 
and significant effect of minimum liquidity requirement ratio on the size of bank capital. 
The minimum liquidity requirement ratio aimed to allow financial institutions to have a 
sufficient liquidity in times of short-term disruptions. This requirement needs effective 
liquidity management that enables to estimate the adequate liquidity which is enough to 
meet the demand of depositors. However in Kenya, there is implementation problem of 
this regulation as the minimum requirement creates excess liquidity that is not able to 
promote bank’s capital to total asset. It is  due to the inability of supervisor’s in the 
estimation of the minimum requirement that is enough for financial cushion for banks  to 





5.5 Result of Variance Decomposition 
 
In this sub-section, the result of variance decomposition is discussed. Variance 
decomposition shows the degree of the forecast error variance of every single variable in 
the model can be explained by shocks that are exogenous to the remaining variables 
(Akande, 2018). It also considers information on the proportion of movements in a 
sequence that are due to the shock in the variable itself and other shocks identified. It 
distinguishes the variation of the endogenous shocks into the component shocks of 
SVAR.    
Table 5.2: Result of variance decomposition of D(zt) 
 
Period D(zt) D(bct ) D(gt) D(lt)  D(rt) 
1 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
4 95.30 0.28 1.29 1.05 2.10 
8 36.74 0.14 0.66 20.39 42.11 
12 27.54 2.61 1.11 25.85 42.90 
 
                   Source: Own computation using EViews 10 
 
The result of variance decomposition indicates that, in Kenya, the main source of 
fluctuation in financial stability is from financial stability, capital adequacy to risk-
weighted assets ratio and liquidity coverage ratio. In the first quarter of 1995, the 
fluctuation in financial stability was fully from financial stability itself. This result is 
parallel to the assumption we made in the previous section that shocks in the financial 
regulation variables transmitted to financial regulation with a lag. The contribution of 
financial stability decreases to 27.54% in the 12th quarter. On average, around  12% of the 
variation in the financial stability of Kenya is occurred by liquidity requirement ratio. In 
the 12th quarter, 25.85% of fluctuation in financial stability was from the liquidity 
requirement ratio. This variation was around 20.39% in the previous quarter (quarter 8). 
52 
 
This result is consistent with the result of impulse response that implies that the variation 
in financial stability is better explained by the liquidity requirement ratio. The 42.11% of 
fluctuation in financial stability is from shocks in capital regulation in the 8th quarter and 
increases to 42.90 % in the 12th quarter.  
To sum up, financial regulation variables have statistically significant effect from the 
impulse response result and it is confirmed from the variance decomposition result. The 
change in financial stability that proxies by z score explain the fluctuation of financial 
stability in Kenya by 27.54%, capital regulation shocks explains by 42.90%, and liquidity 
ratio by 25.85% in the 12th period. Therefore, it is easy to conclude that the effect of 
financial regulation variables on financial stability increases as time goes up. This is 
confirmed by the contribution of capital adequacy ratio. It was reported in the first 
quarter of the variance decomposition result that this variable has no significant effect on 
the financial stability of Kenya. However, it is observed that the contribution increases 
gradually from zero to 42.90%. This means, the implementation of this regulation takes 
time to affect the financial stability of Kenya. 
5.6  Result of Robustness Test 
 
The variable ordering of this study is decided after analyzing previous works, theories 
and recommendations of Basel Accord. In addition, the ordering is made using Granger 
causality result. The current ordering assumes that financial stability is not 
contemporaneously affected by policy variables and the ordering was the following,  
 [zt, bct,  gt, lt, rt]. But alternative orderings could be imagined in order to check whether 
the results we found are robust to change in the ordering or not.  
 
Possible orderings of endogenous variables are tested under this section and it is obvious 
that reporting of all the possible combinations of orderings is impossible. Only two 
results are presented in this section. 
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The first ordering is [gt, 𝑙t, rt, bct,  zt ], this ordering assumed that policy variables 
contemporaneously affect financial stability of Kenya. The implementation of Basel 
regulations affects financial stability on spot. The impulse response test result reveals 
similar results with the model of the current study. It confirms that the results are not 
sensitive to changes (See appendix 7.2 below for all results). 
 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of ZT  to ZT
Response to Cholesky  One S.D. (d.f . adjusted) Innovations ± 2 S.E.
 
Source: Own computation using EViews 10 
 
The second ordering assumed the change in the ordering of financial regulation variables 
yields a result that is sensitive to change, [zt, 𝑙t, 𝑏𝑐t , rt,  gt ]. However, the result reveals 
that there is no change in the result of the model. Statistically significant financial 
regulation variables are economically meaningful in the new ordering and insignificant 
variables are stayed the same (See appendix 7.3 below for the full report).   
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6. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
The present study examined the effectiveness of financial regulations on the financial 
stability of Kenya using the Structural Vector Autoregressive model. In order to examine 
the main objective of the study, a time series data ranging from 1995:1 to 2019:4 is 
employed. The major financial regulation variables of this paper are developed from the 
three Basel implementations in the country. These variables are the Capital adequacy 
ratio, bank supervisory guidance measured by the supervisory quality index of Kenya, 
and liquidity coverage ratio.  
Kenya’s financial system performance is measured by key financial institution and 
financial market indicators of financial depth, access and efficiency and compared with 
the average value of its income group, LMICs. The result of trend analysis showed that 
the country’s financial system lags behind the average of LMICs. A permanent positive 
response of financial stability for the shocks in capital adequacy ratio confirms the 
financial stability benefit of capital regulation in Kenya. Minimum liquidity requirement 
regulation of Basel Accord has economically significant, but negative effect in the 
financial stability of Kenya. A one standard deviation shock to bank supervisory 
guidance has no statistically significant effect on the financial stability of Kenya. This 
result is due to the inefficient implementation of this regulation in the country. The 
variance decomposition result implies that the shock to financial stability explains the 
27.54 % of fluctuations in the financial stability of Kenya, capital regulation shock and 
liquidity coverage ratio explains 42.90% and 25.85% respectively.  
Based on the main findings of the study, the following key policies are recommended: 
The central bank of Kenya needs to hire highly qualified, responsible, transparent, and 
independent staff for the implementation of financial regulations like bank supervision. 
A conducive financial environment is essential for the implementation of Basel Accords 
as the result supports that financial regulations have a significant effect on the financial 
stability of Kenya.  
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Efforts on managerial efficiency and information about the true quality of bank balance 
sheets need a priority for the successful implementation of Basel. 
Limitations of the study and scope for future researchers 
This study examined the effectiveness of financial regulation on the financial stability of 
Kenya. It tried to fill on the existing methodology, time and literature gap. However, the 
study has its own  limitations which will be addressed by future researchers.  One 
objective of the paper was to measure the performance of financial system in Kenya. The 
objective was planned to address by making comparison with the performance of other 
countries. However, the comparison is made only for financial depth due to data 
unavailability for other characteristics. In addition, this study is conducted in a single 
country case due to time limitation. I suggest to explore the effectiveness of financial 
regulation on the financial stability of developing countries using a panel data analysis 
by considering potential representative countries to get a deep insight on the 
effectiveness of Basel Accords. Thus, future researchers can  intervene on this topic by 
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Appendix 1: Granger Causality Test result 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 05/11/21   Time: 12:38 
Sample: 1995Q1 2019Q4 
Lags: 4   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs  F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     BCT does not Granger Cause ZT  96 0.60615 0.6592 
 ZT does not Granger Cause BCT 3.69325 0.0357 
    
     GT does not Granger Cause ZT  96  0.01384 0.9996 
 ZT does not Granger Cause GT 4.96286 0.0131 
    
     LT does not Granger Cause ZT  96  1.86661 0.1235 
 ZT does not Granger Cause LT         4.83677 0.0014 
    
     RT does not Granger Cause ZT  96         0.93042 0.4502 
 ZT does not Granger Cause RT  4.85568 0.0014 
    
     GT does not Granger Cause BCT  96  0.11251 0.9778 
 BCT does not Granger Cause GT  0.28095 0.8896 
    
     LT does not Granger Cause BCT  96  0.31823 0.8651 
 BCT does not Granger Cause LT  4.07581 0.0045 
    
     RT does not Granger Cause BCT  96  1.52224 0.2027 
 BCT does not Granger Cause RT  0.46196 0.7634 
    
     LT does not Granger Cause GT  96  0.20313 0.9360 
 GT does not Granger Cause LT  1.63124 0.1736 
    
     RT does not Granger Cause GT  96  0.11022 0.9786 
 GT does not Granger Cause RT  0.24627 0.9112 
    
     RT does not Granger Cause LT  96  1.63143 0.1736 
 LT does not Granger Cause RT  2.09279 0.0886 
    
    
Appendix 2: Unit Root Test Result 
Appendix 2.1: ADF unit root test result 
Variable t-statistics of 
ADF test 
Critical Value 





Z-score(zt) -3.432839 -3.153989 0.0529 I(0)* 











Liquid assets to deposit and 
short funding (lt) 




Bank regulatory capital to risk-
weighted assets (rt) 








of PP test 
Critical 






Z-score(zt) -6.538569 -3.498439 0.0000 I(1)
*** 
Bank capital to total asset 
ratio (bct) 
-5.858632 -3.498439 0.0000 I(1)*** 
 








Liquid assets to deposit and 
short funding (lt) 
-5.254918 -4.054393 0.0002 I(1)*** 
 
Bank regulatory capital to 
risk-weighted assets (rt) 
-5.891563 -3.498439 0.0000 I(1)*** 
 
***, and * shows 1%, and 10% level of significance respectively, there is a unit root is the null hypothesis 
of this test.    
Source: Own computation using EViews 10 
Appendix 3: Lag Length selection 
 
Lag LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 NA 22.80060  20.15404  20.31851  20.22042 
1 1258.422  1.86e-05  6.131691  7.282942  6.596346 
2 151.4258  6.03e-06  4.997517  7.135555*  5.860448 
3 26.15027  9.45e-06  5.421903  8.546728  6.683109 
4 13.03122  1.79e-05  6.010016  10.12163  7.669497 
5 213.1699  1.28e-06  3.298036  8.396435  5.355793 
6 66.15194*  9.56e-07*  2.877882*  8.963068  5.333915* 
7 14.83426  1.86e-06  3.357751  10.42972  6.212059 
8 18.65638  3.42e-06  3.706490  11.76525  6.959074 
* indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
Source: Own computation using EViews 10 
 
Appendix 4: VAR Estimation Result 
 
Vector Autoregression Estimates   
Date: 05/11/21   Time: 12:24    
Sample (adjusted): 1996Q3 2019Q4   
Included observations: 94 after adjustments   
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]   
      
       ZT BCT GT LT RT 
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      ZT(-1)  1.528677  0.020002  0.006128  0.023305  0.432628 
  (0.12969)  (0.15401)  (0.01367)  (0.45184)  (0.28560) 
 [ 11.7876] [ 0.12988] [ 0.44829] [ 0.05158] [ 1.51482] 
      
ZT(-2) -0.602093 -0.062621 -0.009329 -0.192399 -0.396656 
  (0.14977)  (0.17785)  (0.01579)  (0.52181)  (0.32982) 
 [-4.02020] [-0.35209] [-0.59100] [-0.36871] [-1.20263] 
      
ZT(-3) -0.019374 -0.005026 -0.001721  0.031188 -0.012553 
  (0.09454)  (0.11227)  (0.00996)  (0.32938)  (0.20819) 
 [-0.20494] [-0.04477] [-0.17274] [ 0.09469] [-0.06030] 
      
ZT(-4) -0.786497  0.109872  0.008677 -0.221159 -0.236398 
  (0.09454)  (0.11227)  (0.00996)  (0.32939)  (0.20820) 
 [-8.31922] [ 0.97864] [ 0.87084] [-0.67142] [-1.13544] 
      
ZT(-5)  1.219766 -0.156325 -0.002758  0.419513  0.647381 
  (0.14271)  (0.16947)  (0.01504)  (0.49721)  (0.31428) 
 [ 8.54733] [-0.92243] [-0.18339] [ 0.84373] [ 2.05992] 
      
ZT(-6) -0.520872  0.000373 -0.008221 -0.357045 -0.425661 
  (0.11723)  (0.13921)  (0.01236)  (0.40844)  (0.25816) 
 [-4.44326] [ 0.00268] [-0.66536] [-0.87417] [-1.64881] 
      
BCT(-1) -0.094457  1.453901 -0.002760  0.093724 -0.257528 
  (0.11288)  (0.13404)  (0.01190)  (0.39327)  (0.24858) 
 [-0.83682] [ 10.8464] [-0.23203] [ 0.23832] [-1.03600] 
      
BCT(-2)  0.119747 -0.431971  0.001884 -0.068407  0.199631 
  (0.15630)  (0.18562)  (0.01647)  (0.54458)  (0.34422) 
 [ 0.76612] [-2.32723] [ 0.11438] [-0.12561] [ 0.57996] 
      
BCT(-3) -0.012896 -0.050093  0.001977  0.012907  0.006682 
  (0.13264)  (0.15751)  (0.01398)  (0.46212)  (0.29209) 
 [-0.09723] [-0.31803] [ 0.14145] [ 0.02793] [ 0.02288] 
      
BCT(-4) -0.082891 -0.821145 -0.011211  0.049647 -0.304450 
  (0.13266)  (0.15754)  (0.01398)  (0.46221)  (0.29215) 
 [-0.62483] [-5.21222] [-0.80176] [ 0.10741] [-1.04209] 
      
BCT(-5)  0.034856  1.162739  0.008988  0.050850  0.244293 
  (0.15474)  (0.18376)  (0.01631)  (0.53913)  (0.34077) 
 [ 0.22526] [ 6.32750] [ 0.55106] [ 0.09432] [ 0.71688] 
      
BCT(-6)  0.041855 -0.433834 -0.000340 -0.165920  0.002762 
  (0.10330)  (0.12267)  (0.01089)  (0.35990)  (0.22748) 
 [ 0.40519] [-3.53666] [-0.03125] [-0.46102] [ 0.01214] 
      
GT(-1) -1.472915 -1.022657  0.817518 -7.153259 -0.608574 
  (1.22928)  (1.45982)  (0.12957)  (4.28299)  (2.70717) 
 [-1.19819] [-0.70054] [ 6.30965] [-1.67016] [-0.22480] 
      
GT(-2)  1.393315  0.757061  0.033127  1.730952  0.271406 
  (1.57127)  (1.86595)  (0.16561)  (5.47454)  (3.46032) 
 [ 0.88674] [ 0.40572] [ 0.20002] [ 0.31618] [ 0.07843] 
      
GT(-3)  0.176036  0.381184  0.007986  0.965974  0.275078 
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  (1.53298)  (1.82048)  (0.16158)  (5.34113)  (3.37599) 
 [ 0.11483] [ 0.20939] [ 0.04942] [ 0.18086] [ 0.08148] 
      
GT(-4)  2.113222  1.329751  0.258166  0.334527 -0.651205 
  (1.55335)  (1.84467)  (0.16372)  (5.41209)  (3.42085) 
 [ 1.36043] [ 0.72086] [ 1.57685] [ 0.06181] [-0.19036] 
      
GT(-5) -2.971650 -2.003984 -0.223208  0.815262  0.007887 
  (1.59894)  (1.89881)  (0.16853)  (5.57093)  (3.52124) 
 [-1.85852] [-1.05539] [-1.32446] [ 0.14634] [ 0.00224] 
      
GT(-6) -0.536024  0.152711 -0.107030 -1.924061  2.085779 
  (1.26356)  (1.50054)  (0.13318)  (4.40244)  (2.78267) 
 [-0.42422] [ 0.10177] [-0.80365] [-0.43704] [ 0.74956] 
      
LT(-1) -0.008948 -0.018576  0.000931  1.445423 -0.092174 
  (0.03783)  (0.04492)  (0.00399)  (0.13180)  (0.08331) 
 [-0.23654] [-0.41349] [ 0.23343] [ 10.9665] [-1.10640] 
      
LT(-2) -0.000503 -0.002123 -0.001253 -0.371020  0.054004 
  (0.06169)  (0.07326)  (0.00650)  (0.21495)  (0.13586) 
 [-0.00815] [-0.02897] [-0.19271] [-1.72610] [ 0.39749] 
      
LT(-3)  0.004693  0.001155  0.002343 -0.093654  0.003423 
  (0.05951)  (0.07067)  (0.00627)  (0.20733)  (0.13105) 
 [ 0.07886] [ 0.01635] [ 0.37362] [-0.45171] [ 0.02612] 
      
LT(-4) -0.042769 -0.041282 -0.015854 -0.522932  0.158725 
  (0.05968)  (0.07087)  (0.00629)  (0.20792)  (0.13142) 
 [-0.71668] [-0.58252] [-2.52049] [-2.51504] [ 1.20775] 
      
LT(-5)  0.036807  0.055001  0.015764  0.602398 -0.247751 
  (0.06254)  (0.07427)  (0.00659)  (0.21791)  (0.13773) 
 [ 0.58851] [ 0.74053] [ 2.39145] [ 2.76446] [-1.79877] 
      
LT(-6) -0.011256 -0.030917 -0.003635 -0.182091  0.082875 
  (0.03679)  (0.04369)  (0.00388)  (0.12818)  (0.08102) 
 [-0.30597] [-0.70767] [-0.93759] [-1.42064] [ 1.02294] 
      
RT(-1)  0.028573 -0.039735 -0.000171 -0.096808  1.356070 
  (0.05772)  (0.06854)  (0.00608)  (0.20110)  (0.12711) 
 [ 0.49504] [-0.57972] [-0.02815] [-0.48139] [ 10.6685] 
      
RT(-2)  0.003519  0.037997  0.001530 -0.044619 -0.328714 
  (0.08698)  (0.10329)  (0.00917)  (0.30304)  (0.19154) 
 [ 0.04046] [ 0.36788] [ 0.16692] [-0.14724] [-1.71615] 
      
RT(-3)  0.000401 -0.001473  0.001701  0.026587 -0.075870 
  (0.07902)  (0.09384)  (0.00833)  (0.27531)  (0.17402) 
 [ 0.00507] [-0.01569] [ 0.20423] [ 0.09657] [-0.43599] 
      
RT(-4)  0.265825  0.068200 -0.017732 -0.272181 -0.575539 
  (0.07908)  (0.09392)  (0.00834)  (0.27554)  (0.17416) 
 [ 3.36127] [ 0.72618] [-2.12728] [-0.98780] [-3.30459] 
      
RT(-5) -0.426074 -0.174284  0.012416  0.249162  0.551540 
  (0.09623)  (0.11427)  (0.01014)  (0.33527)  (0.21191) 
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 [-4.42783] [-1.52515] [ 1.22415] [ 0.74318] [ 2.60267] 
      
RT(-6)  0.221709  0.127641  0.002927 -0.067603 -0.086378 
  (0.06654)  (0.07901)  (0.00701)  (0.23182)  (0.14653) 
 [ 3.33219] [ 1.61543] [ 0.41741] [-0.29162] [-0.58950] 
      
C  1.478910  3.672718  0.116338  10.63936  5.559102 
  (1.32590)  (1.57457)  (0.13975)  (4.61964)  (2.91996) 
 [ 1.11540] [ 2.33252] [ 0.83247] [ 2.30307] [ 1.90383] 
      
      R-squared  0.992766  0.983300  0.847121  0.994784  0.964904 
Adj. R-squared  0.989322  0.975347  0.774322  0.992300  0.948192 
Sum sq. Resids  4.480532  6.318712  0.049775  54.39036  21.72996 
S.E. equation  0.266682  0.316697  0.028108  0.929160  0.587299 
F-statistic  288.2049  123.6449  11.63638  400.5000  57.73598 
Log likelihood  9.666769 -6.490593  221.1660 -107.6662 -64.54389 
Akaike AIC  0.453899  0.797672 -4.046085  2.950344  2.032849 
Schwarz SC  1.292645  1.636418 -3.207339  3.789090  2.871595 
Mean dependent  16.38026  13.13701 -0.247660  26.18904  17.91217 
S.D. dependent  2.580720  2.017011  0.059169  10.58880  2.580237 
      
      Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  9.05E-07    
Determinant resid covariance  1.22E-07    
Log likelihood  81.16684    
Akaike information criterion  1.570918    
Schwarz criterion  5.764649    
Number of coefficients  155    
      
       
 
          
 
Appendix 5: SVAR Estimation Result 
 
 
Structural VAR Estimates   
Date: 05/11/21   Time: 12:24   
Sample (adjusted): 1996Q3 2019Q4  
Included observations: 94 after adjustments  
Estimation method: Maximum likelihood via Newton-Raphson (analytic 
        derivatives)   
Convergence achieved after 20 iterations  
Structural VAR is just-identified  
     
     Model: Ae = Bu where E[uu']=I   
A =    
1 0 0 0 0 
C(1) 1 0 0 0 
C(2) C(5) 1 0 0 
C(3) C(6) C(8) 1 0 
C(4) C(7) C(9) C(10) 1 
B =    
C(11) 0 0 0 0 
0 C(12) 0 0 0 
0 0 C(13) 0 0 
0 0 0 C(14) 0 
0 0 0 0 C(15) 
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 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
     
     C(1) -0.648579  0.102605 -6.321145  0.0000 
C(2) -0.029806  0.012565 -2.372221  0.0177 
C(3) -0.820552  0.421591 -1.946324  0.0516 
C(4)  0.177896  0.270038  0.658783  0.5100 
C(5)  0.006554  0.010580  0.619467  0.5356 
C(6)  0.171098  0.345542  0.495158  0.6205 
C(7) -0.522776  0.217280 -2.405997  0.0161 
C(8) -5.483627  3.361604 -1.631253  0.1028 
C(9) -0.863603  2.140732 -0.403415  0.6866 
C(10)  0.130692  0.064772  2.017715  0.0436 
C(11)  0.266682  0.019450  13.71131  0.0000 
C(12)  0.265293  0.019348  13.71131  0.0000 
C(13)  0.027214  0.001985  13.71131  0.0000 
C(14)  0.886962  0.064688  13.71131  0.0000 
C(15)  0.557005  0.040624  13.71131  0.0000 
     
     Log likelihood -12.87077    
     
     Estimated A matrix:   
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
-0.648579  1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
-0.029806  0.006554  1.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
-0.820552  0.171098 -5.483627  1.000000  0.000000 
 0.177896 -0.522776 -0.863603  0.130692  1.000000 
Estimated B matrix:   
 0.266682  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 0.000000  0.265293  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 0.000000  0.000000  0.027214  0.000000  0.000000 
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.886962  0.000000 
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.557005 
Estimated S matrix:   
 0.266682  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 0.172965  0.265293  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 0.006815 -0.001739  0.027214  0.000000  0.000000 
 0.226605 -0.054926  0.149232  0.886962  0.000000 
 0.019250  0.144365  0.003999 -0.115919  0.557005 
Estimated F matrix:   
 2.362620 -2.353911  6.754259 -11.21504  13.33782 
 0.916807  0.604643  5.741879 -8.385742  7.703761 
-0.022123 -0.022239  0.155325 -0.003400 -0.045403 
-3.865854  10.25722 -34.42530  51.66174 -52.70322 
 0.427317 -2.467631  6.682333 -8.941717  12.14479 
     
     
 
Appendix 6: Autocorrelation Test Results 
 
 
VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests   
Date: 04/16/21   Time: 16:13    
Sample: 1995Q1 2019Q4     
Included observations: 94    
       
       Null 
hypothesi





n at lag h 
       
       Lag LRE* stat df Prob. Rao F-stat Df Prob. 
       
       1  15.02629  36  0.9992  0.398757 (36, 204.8)  0.9992 
2  8.610667  36  1.0000  0.225193 (36, 204.8)  1.0000 
3  31.52552  36  0.6813  0.868875 (36, 204.8)  0.6842 
4  158.9897  36  0.0000  5.961727 (36, 204.8)  0.0000 
5  31.50061  36  0.6825  0.868138 (36, 204.8)  0.6854 
6  23.51692  36  0.9458  0.636313 (36, 204.8)  0.9465 
       
       
 
Appendix 7: Impulse Response Results 
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Appendix 8: Result of Variance Decomposition 
 
 
       
        Variance 
Decomposit
ion of ZT:       
 Period S.E. ZT BCT GT LT RT 
       
        1  0.266682  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.466676  98.89539  0.146811  0.783390  0.058100  0.116304 
 3  0.631492  97.45664  0.249779  1.221232  0.367152  0.705192 
 4  0.763989  95.30006  0.280760  1.290120  1.047668  2.081394 
 5  0.853582  80.08394  0.227344  1.059950  5.040511  13.58826 
 6  0.968812  62.30668  0.176523  1.068033  10.41893  26.02983 
 7  1.114585  47.37529  0.138132  0.880740  15.80535  35.80048 
 8  1.283833  36.73578  0.139805  0.664062  20.39128  42.06907 
 9  1.365511  32.48919  0.630604  0.732395  23.42367  42.72414 
 10  1.429753  29.64958  1.316538  0.995284  25.36154  42.67706 
 11  1.472994  28.09044  2.011178  1.114234  26.06021  42.72394 
 12  1.500206  27.53907  2.608942  1.114879  25.84518  42.89193 
       
        Variance 
Decomposit
ion of BCT:       
 Period S.E. ZT BCT GT LT RT 
       
        1  0.316697  29.82816  70.17184  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.555289  29.14744  70.34111  0.306889  0.045692  0.158868 
 3  0.761179  27.36751  71.43702  0.551109  0.289025  0.355345 
 4  0.933151  25.12093  72.88470  0.574879  0.876095  0.543393 
 5  0.990108  23.29476  72.01769  0.512563  3.650245  0.524742 
 6  1.026415  21.67946  69.24562  0.632463  7.954068  0.488390 
 7  1.065838  20.58733  64.48747  0.927576  13.39352  0.604105 
 8  1.121121  20.05050  58.36085  1.286811  19.01075  1.291096 
 9  1.168110  19.31482  53.88975  1.609891  22.94370  2.241837 
 10  1.219191  18.36360  49.64484  1.850864  26.16499  3.975704 
 11  1.267225  17.23201  46.20322  2.081568  28.34354  6.139668 
 12  1.309211  16.15574  43.63595  2.349151  29.52155  8.337600 
       
        Variance 
Decomposit
ion of GT:       
 Period S.E. ZT BCT GT LT RT 
       
        1  0.028108  5.878766  0.382672  93.73856  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.036675  7.029818  0.594402  92.32197  0.053136  0.000677 
 3  0.041676  7.120954  0.773411  92.00981  0.062624  0.033204 
 4  0.045204  6.781302  0.788264  91.81465  0.230555  0.385231 
 5  0.050453  5.460483  1.985994  88.07618  3.059528  1.417811 
 6  0.055279  4.683079  2.934491  84.52989  5.196808  2.655731 
 7  0.058787  4.878045  3.449418  80.94207  7.273870  3.456597 
 8  0.061601  5.938538  3.782409  77.14445  9.154260  3.980339 
 9  0.063630  6.343924  3.547336  75.54575  10.78759  3.775394 
 10  0.065309  6.587938  3.368856  73.55407  12.55032  3.938818 
 11  0.066591  6.577961  3.272983  71.51889  13.64913  4.981039 
 12  0.067860  6.351063  3.276181  69.09638  14.11963  7.156747 
       





ion of LT:       
 Period S.E. ZT BCT GT LT RT 
       
        1  0.929160  5.947813  0.349440  2.579548  91.12320  0.000000 
 2  1.622326  5.355780  0.234051  0.862349  93.43734  0.110475 
 3  2.279520  4.132781  0.166241  0.814890  94.22764  0.658451 
 4  2.903403  2.943042  0.108963  1.461479  93.64887  1.837652 
 5  3.345327  2.330370  0.084917  3.191196  88.41883  5.974682 
 6  3.758872  2.472600  0.188247  4.540796  81.30953  11.48882 
 7  4.171673  3.174669  0.537992  5.924002  72.80845  17.55489 
 8  4.586412  4.137142  1.102740  7.153576  64.23628  23.37026 
 9  4.962393  4.419553  1.955867  8.022391  58.39578  27.20641 
 10  5.300654  4.538701  2.642608  8.796822  53.95959  30.06228 
 11  5.596951  4.465937  3.153314  9.352676  51.03628  31.99179 
 12  5.858782  4.248520  3.480449  9.735364  49.30807  33.22759 
       
        Variance 
Decomposit
ion of RT:       
 Period S.E. ZT BCT GT LT RT 
       
        1  0.587299  0.107434  6.042375  0.004636  3.895757  89.94980 
 2  0.998090  0.556152  3.883055  0.063817  7.080422  88.41655 
 3  1.372120  0.862778  2.424157  0.141816  10.61315  85.95810 
 4  1.717209  1.008692  1.560881  0.140936  14.42906  82.86043 
 5  1.875862  0.857536  2.603867  0.121084  16.08546  80.33205 
 6  1.984390  0.853500  4.689627  0.137338  16.75778  77.56176 
 7  2.062390  1.098615  7.541690  0.432097  16.49964  74.42796 
 8  2.125681  1.521009  10.62673  1.122930  15.69217  71.03716 
 9  2.160981  1.523706  11.55816  1.848430  15.38082  69.68888 
 10  2.187125  1.511456  11.75160  2.684240  15.15181  68.90089 
 11  2.212579  1.798103  11.52024  3.416662  15.08131  68.18368 
 12  2.247493  2.596580  11.22098  4.036284  15.23976  66.90639 
       
        Cholesky Ordering: ZT BCT GT LT RT    
       
        
 
